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Comments
Disgorgement of Defendant’s Gains
from “Opportunistic” Breach of
Contract: Its Fit in Rhode Island
Kelsey A. Hayward*

For breach of contract, should the plaintiff/non-breaching
party be able to get a remedy based on any profit the defendant
made from the breach? Contract law generally answers “no”: The
norm is that the non-breaching party who seeks a monetary
remedy is entitled to “compensation” for its losses resulting from
the breach rather than “disgorgement” or “restitution” of the
defendant’s gains resulting from the breach.1 But consider the
following scenario from the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment (2011):
Farmer sells Buyer his entire crop of carrots for the
coming season at a price of $500 per ton. It is in Buyer’s
interest to be the exclusive distributor of Farmer’s
carrots, and Farmer’s obligation to tender his entire
output is a material term of the parties’ agreement. Bad
weather results in a reduced harvest and higher prices.
Farmer delivers 20 tons of carrots to Buyer, then sells a
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2018. Thank you to Professor Colleen Murphy, Clare Harmon, and Gregory
Henninger for all of your guidance and support throughout the writing
process.
1.
Long v. Atlantic PBS, Inc., 681 A.2d 249, 253 (R.I. 1996).
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further 10 tons to a competing buyer at $800 per ton.2
The Restatement (Third) indicates that the Buyer need not be
relegated to compensation based on its loss resulting from the
breach.3 Instead, the Buyer may obtain disgorgement of Farmer’s
gain resulting from the breach—$3000 (10 tons sold to a different
purchaser for $300 per ton more than the contract price between
Farmer and Buyer).4 This disgorgement remedy is advantageous
when defendant’s gain is greater than plaintiff’s loss, or when the
plaintiff more easily can prove defendant’s gain than the plaintiff’s
own loss. The disgorgement remedy on these facts is justified
because the Farmer intentionally breached the contract and a
compensatory remedy based on Buyer’s loss resulting from the
breach might insufficiently protect the very thing that Buyer
bargained for in the contract—the right to be the exclusive
distributor of Farmer’s carrots.5
Beyond this illustration, Restatement (Third) Section 39
broadly recognizes a remedy for disgorgement of a defendant’s
gains in a limited category of breach of contract actions.6 Under
Restatement (Third) Section 39, the disgorgement remedy is
available when: (1) the breach is deliberate, (2) the breach is
profitable, and (3) the claimant’s contractual entitlement cannot
adequately be protected by an award for compensatory damages.7
When these three conditions are met, the breach is “opportunistic”
and can be remedied by restitution—disgorgement of the
defendant’s gains—rather than compensation.8 The critical policy
argument supporting the disgorgement remedy for “opportunistic”
breaches is that one who intentionally breaches a contract should
not be allowed to keep its gains if a compensatory remedy would
inadequately protect the plaintiff’s bargained-for entitlement
under the contract.9 The disgorgement remedy does not punish
2.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
cmt. h, illus. 14 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
See id.
6.
Id. § 39.
7.
Id.
8.
See id.
9.
See id. § 39 cmt. b (“A promisor who was permitted to exploit the
shortcomings of the promisee’s damage remedy could accept the price of the
promised performance, then deliver something less than what was promised.
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the defendant, but instead, “merely deprives a defendant of a
profit wrongfully made.”10
In this Comment, I argue that, based on the trend toward
disgorgement in other jurisdictions, and Rhode Island’s past
recognition of a remedy based on defendant’s gains in breach of
contract for the sale of land and in contexts other than breach of
contract, Rhode Island should recognize the disgorgement remedy
as an alternative to compensatory damages in “opportunistic”
breaches of contract. Part I of this Comment will address the
state of the law in other jurisdictions, demonstrating that both
before and after the adoption of Restatement (Third) Section 39,
disgorgement has been a widely accepted alternative to a typical
compensatory damages remedy. Part II shows that Rhode Island
case law already recognizes a disgorgement remedy for a breach of
contract for the sale of land and in the non-contractual settings of
unfair competition and breach of fiduciary duty. Part III argues
that based on the trend of other jurisdictions and the logical
implications of the Rhode Island disgorgement cases, Rhode
Island courts should allow a claimant to recover disgorgement of
defendant’s gains in “opportunistic” breaches of contract—as
described in Restatement (Third) Section 39—because a
disgorgement remedy protects a plaintiff’s contractual entitlement
and deprives an intentionally breaching party of wrongful gains.
I.

MODERN TREND TOWARD DISGORGEMENT OF DEFENDANT’S GAINS
IN CERTAIN TYPES OF BREACH OF CONTRACT CASES

Courts have increasingly allowed plaintiffs to recover
defendant’s gains in a claim for restitution when there has been
an “opportunistic” breach of contract.11 Even before the inclusion
of Section 39 in the Restatement (Third), several jurisdictions
awarded disgorgement of defendant’s gains in breach of contract
actions for certain types of contracts, including contracts for the
sale of land, contractual protection of confidential information,
Such an outcome results in unjust enrichment as between the parties.”).
10. Laurin v. DeCarolis Const. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675, 679 (Mass. 1977);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. e
(AM. LAW INST. 2011).
11. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 514, 515–16 (1980);
Laurin, 363 N.E.2d at 678–79; Y.J.D. Rest. Supply Co. v. Dib, 413 N.Y.S.2d
835, 836 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
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and non-compete agreements.12 Several courts have since
adopted the language of Restatement (Third) Section 39, allowing
for disgorgement of a defendant’s gain when there has been an
“opportunistic” breach of contract.13 In fact, one jurisdiction even
expanded the remedy allowed in the Restatement (Third).14
A.

Pre-Restatement (Third) Section 39

Restatement (Third) Section 39 draws from the common law
in jurisdictions that have allowed for this remedy in several types
of contract cases, most notably, contracts for the sale of land,
confidentiality agreements, and non-compete agreements.15
1.

Contracts for the Sale of Land

Before the existence of the Restatement (Third) Section 39,
several jurisdictions permitted a plaintiff to recover defendant’s
gains greater than plaintiff’s losses for deliberate breach of a
contract for the sale of land.16 In general, courts tended to treat
contracts for the sale of land differently because real property was
considered to be unique.17 In a contract for the sale of land, a
buyer bargains to receive the land in a certain condition. Should
the defendant deliberately change the condition of that land, by,
for example, extracting materials such as trees or fill from the
land after execution of the contract, the buyer does not receive the
land for which he or she bargained.18 In a straightforward breach
of contract action, a compensatory damage remedy would afford
the buyer the difference between the contract price and the fair
market value of the land after the damage.19 However, this
12.
See, e.g., Snepp, 444 U.S. at 514, 515–16; Laurin, 363 N.E.2d at
678–79; Y.J.D. Rest. Supply Co., 413 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
13.
See Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1056–57 (2015); Enslin v.
Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 676–77 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
14.
See Watson v. Cal-Three, LLC, 254 P.3d 1189, 1194–95, 1196 (Colo.
App. 2011).
15.
See, e.g., Snepp, 444 U.S. at 515–16; Laurin, 363 N.E.2d at 678–79;
Y.J.D. Rest. Supply Co., 413 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
16.
See Laurin, 363 N.E.2d at 678; May v. Muroff, 483 So. 2d 772, 772
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
17.
Jolicoeur Furniture Co. v. Baldelli, 653 A.2d 740, 749 (R.I. 1995).
18.
See Laurin, 363 N.E.2d at 677; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d, illus. 1, 2 (AM. LAW INST.
2011).
19.
See Laurin, 363 N.E.2d at 678.
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compensatory damage remedy does not restore the land to the
condition to which the buyer is entitled under the contract. Thus,
because real property is unique, compensatory damages are often
inadequate to compensate a buyer for damaged property.20 Where
the breach of contract for the sale of land is deliberate, courts have
found that the buyer is entitled to the seller’s gains as a result of
the breach of the contract because compensatory damages are
inadequate to protect the buyer’s contractual entitlement to the
land in its existing condition at the time of contract formation.21
To demonstrate this principle, the drafters of Restatement
(Third) Section 39 cited to Laurin v. DeCarolis Construction Co.22
In that Massachusetts case, the seller of a plot of land deliberately
removed and sold gravel, trees, and shrubs after executing the
contract with the buyer.23 The court ordered the defendant to
disgorge his gains—the $6,480 value of the gravel—to the plaintiff
because the breach was deliberate and willful, and the plaintiff
was entitled to the land as it was contracted for, with the trees,
shrubs, and gravel included.24 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Laurin reasoned that deliberate breaches similar
to this likely will not result in a major diminution in fair market
value of the land.25 Therefore, disgorgement of profits is an
effective remedy because it “deprives the defendant of a profit
wrongfully made” so that the wrongful party cannot “shield”
himself from increased liability by claiming that the value of the
land after damage had only decreased marginally.26 Other courts
have reiterated this approach in similar situations in contracts for
the sale of land where the breach is deliberate and defendant has
profited as a result of the breach.27
In Laurin, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
20.
Id.
21.
Id. at 678–79.
22.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
rep. note on cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2011); see Laurin, 363 N.E.2d at 679.
23.
Laurin, 363 N.E.2d at 676.
24.
Id. at 677, 678–79.
25.
Id. at 678.
26.
Id. at 678–79.
27. See May v. Muroff, 483 So. 2d 772, 772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(finding that plaintiff is entitled to disgorgement of defendant’s profit of
$240,000 from deliberately removing and selling fill from property rather
than compensatory damages of $122,067 after executing a contract for the
sale of the land).
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emphasized that a remedy of disgorgement of gains by the
defendant is appropriate only in certain cases.28 Specifically, the
court focused on the fact that the breach of contract was willful
and deliberate.29 Second, the court recognized that “damages
limited to the diminution in value of the premises,” the ordinary
measure of compensatory damages for breach of contract, “may
sometimes be seriously inadequate.”30 Lastly, the court explicitly
stated that a remedy ordering a defendant to disgorge gains in
this situation is “not punitive” and, instead, affords the plaintiff
the value or profit to which he or she was entitled under the
contract.31
2.

Contractual Protection of Confidential Information

Courts have also recognized a remedy for disgorgement of
defendant’s gains from breach of contractual protection of
confidential information.32 In the principle case demonstrating
this proposition, Snepp v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court allowed the CIA to recover Snepp’s profits from
selling a book containing information about his time spent with
the CIA in South Vietnam.33 Snepp’s employment contract
contained a provision requiring him to submit any material
containing information about CIA activities for prepublication
review by the CIA.34 Snepp deliberately breached this provision
of the employment contract by publishing his book without
acquiring the required approval from the CIA, and profited
through his sales of the books.35 The Court allowed for the
disgorgement of Snepp’s profits from the books to the CIA,
because without this remedy, the Government would not be able
to protect its contractual entitlement—the prepublication

28. Laurin v. DeCarolis Const. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675, 678–79 (Mass.
1977).
29.
Id. at 678.
30.
Id.
31.
Id. at 679.
32. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1980); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d,
illus. 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
33.
Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507, 515–16.
34.
Id. at 507–08.
35.
Id. at 508.
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review.36
Similar to the sale of land, courts consider the contractual
entitlement to confidential information a right that cannot be
adequately remedied through ordinary compensatory damages for
a breach of contract action.37 Indeed, in Snepp, the Court
awarded the plaintiff disgorgement of defendant’s profits even
though the Government conceded that it did not actually sustain
losses from Snepp’s breach because the book did not reveal any
classified information.38 If a potential plaintiff in this situation
could not recover the defendant’s gains, the plaintiff would be
much more vulnerable in protecting its contractual rights and
position because the defendant could deliberately breach, knowing
that the breach is likely to yield little or no provable loss to the
plaintiff. Without the disgorgement remedy, the plaintiff cannot
protect his or her contractual rights and the defendant can breach
the contract with little repercussion. The defendant should not be
unjustly enriched “at the expense of the plaintiff.”39
3.

Non-Compete Contracts

Third, courts have recognized a remedy requiring
disgorgement of defendant’s gains in actions for deliberate breach
of a non-compete contract.40 In this situation, the plaintiff’s
contractual entitlement is to prevent its employees from working
for competitors within a certain amount of time after they leave
the company to prevent the opening of another business to
compete with the plaintiff. A compensatory damage remedy is not
adequate because it is unlikely or difficult to prove that a
defendant’s breach of a non-compete contract directly resulted in
loss to the plaintiff. For example, in Y.J.D. Restaurant Supply Co.
v. Dib, the defendant deliberately breached an agreement not to
36.
Id. at 515–16.
37.
See id. at 514, 516.
38.
Id. at 510.
39.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
40.
See Y.J.D. Rest. Supply Co. v. Dib, 413 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1979) (requiring defendant to disgorge $35,500 in net profits from the sale
of a competing business, thereby deliberately breaching a non-compete
contract, and where the plaintiff could not prove loss of profits); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d,
illus. 6 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
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compete with the plaintiff within a five-block radius for a period of
three years.41 The defendant eventually sold his competing
business, earning a $35,500 profit.42 The plaintiff was unable to
adequately prove his lost profits from the breach, because there
were “too many competitive or economic factors involved . . . to
prove any correct or fair amount of damages.”43 The New York
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the
defendant’s full profit, $35,500, because, “[e]quity will not aid in
any scheme or project which might lead to undeserved profit.”44
Often, a plaintiff may not be able to prove compensable
damages for loss of profits directly resulting from defendant’s
breach due to uncertainty of outside economic and competitive
factors.45 Therefore, a compensatory damage remedy is
inadequate to protect the plaintiff’s entitlement to restrict a
person from competing against his business. Courts have allowed
for disgorgement in restitution to ensure that a defendant does
not benefit unjustly from a breach of a non-compete contract that
is deliberate and profitable.46
B.

Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment
Section 39

The Restatement (Third) Section 39 allows a plaintiff to
recover a breaching party’s profits as a result of an “opportunistic”
breach of contract, provided the breaching party’s profits exceeds
the plaintiff’s provable loss or the plaintiff cannot prove loss.47
There are three requirements for the availability of disgorgement
of defendant gains based on “opportunistic” breach of contract: (1)
a deliberate breach, (2) where the defendant profited as a result of
that breach, and (3) the plaintiff’s contractual entitlement cannot
be protected adequately by compensatory damages.48 For typical
39.
Y.J.D. Rest. Supply Co., 413 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
See id.
44.
See id.
45.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
(AM. LAW INST. 2011).
46.
Id. § 39(1) (“If a deliberate breach of contract results in profit to the
defaulting promisor and the available damage remedy affords inadequate
protection to the promisee’s contractual entitlement, the promise has a claim
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breach of contract actions, the measure of a monetary remedy is
based on plaintiff’s loss, not defendant’s gain.49 Section 39 carves
out a claim in restitution for a certain type of breach of contract,
which it calls “opportunistic.”50 A claim that meets all of the
requirements of this Section is rare.51 Defendant’s gains from the
breach can be measured either by profits earned or the expenses
saved as a result of the breach.52
Contract law recognizes that in some cases, the typical
remedy of compensatory damages is not sufficient to protect the
rights for which the plaintiff bargained in the contract. Where
compensatory damages are insufficient to compensate for that
right, a court may award specific performance of a contract.53 A
disgorgement remedy for “opportunistic” contract provides the
same protection for a non-breaching party that is provided by a
remedy for specific performance, if the plaintiff had brought the
claim earlier in time.54 In granting specific performance, courts
already have recognized that there are situations where
contractual entitlements cannot be protected sufficiently by a
compensatory remedy. A disgorgement remedy for “opportunistic”
breach of contract suggests that courts recognize the same
protection, only after the fact.55
This disgorgement remedy for “opportunistic” breach of
contract intends to protect a party that may be in a vulnerable
position under the contract by deterring a potential breaching
party with the threat that the wrongdoer might be required to
disgorge his gains from the breach.56 The contract rights that this
to restitution of the profit realized by the promisor as a result of the
breach.”).
49.
Long v. Atlantic PBS, Inc., 681 A.2d 249, 253 (R.I. 1996).
50.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
(AM. LAW INST. 2011).
51.
Id. § 39 cmt. a (“The restitution claim described in this section is
infrequently available, because a breach of contract that satisfies the
cumulative tests of § 39 is rare.”).
52.
Id. § 39 cmt. e.
53.
Id. § 39 cmt. a (“Where a party’s contractual entitlement would be
inadequately protected by the legal remedy of damages for breach, a court
will often reinforce the protection given to the claimant by an order of
injunction or specific performance.”).
54.
Id. § 39 cmt. d.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. § 39 cmt. b (“Cases in which restitution reaches the profits from a
breach of contract are those in which the promisee’s contractual position is
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Section seeks to protect “may resemble non-contractual
entitlements
that
are
routinely
protected”
such
as
misappropriation or fiduciary or confidential duty.57 The plaintiff
in an action for “opportunistic” breach of contract would face an
inadequate compensatory damage remedy under the contract, or
may not be able to prove compensable losses at all.58 In a claim
for restitution under Restatement (Third) Section 39, a plaintiff
need not prove their own losses.59 This provision aims to deter a
potential breaching party from deliberately breaching a contract
and taking advantage of decreased liability in the action because
the plaintiff either cannot prove compensable losses or the
compensatory damage remedy would not protect the plaintiff’s
entitlement under the contract.60 Thus, this provision discourages
a party from deliberately breaching a contract because the party
will be required to give its profit to the plaintiff, rather than
receive a windfall from breach of contract after paying a
compensatory damage remedy for the breach.61
1.

Requirements

The first two requirements under Restatement (Third) Section
39 are straightforward: the breach must be deliberate and
profitable.62 This remedy in restitution is only intended to apply
to conscious wrongdoers who willfully breach a contract, not to
unintentional breach of contract.63 Further, this provision is also
only intended to reach those who actually profit from the breach,
where that profit exceeds the non-breaching party’s provable loss
or where the non-breaching party cannot prove its loss.64 While it
may be common for a party to deliberately breach a contract, the
defendant’s profit resulting from this breach does not often exceed

vulnerable to abuse. Vulnerability in this context stems from the difficulty
that the promisee may fact in recovering, as compensatory damages, a full
equivalent of the performance for which the promisee has bargained.”).
57.
Id. § 39 cmt. d.
58.
Id. § 39 cmt. c.
59.
Id. § 39 cmt. b.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Id. § 39(1).
63.
Id. § 39 cmt. f.
64.
Id. § 39(3).
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the plaintiff’s provable losses.65
In order for a plaintiff to recover disgorgement of defendant’s
gain for “opportunistic” breach of contract, the “available damage
remedy” must “afford[] inadequate protection to the promisee’s
contractual entitlement.”66 Essentially, if the traditional contract
remedy of compensatory damages will not protect the right
bargained for under the contract, disgorgement of profits may be
available, provided the first two conditions are met.67 An example
of this occurs in contracts for the sale of land.68 There is no
adequate measure of compensation based on plaintiff’s loss that
could protect the plaintiff’s contractual right to the land in the
condition at the time of the contract or as provided for in the
contract.69
Often, however, a contractual entitlement can be adequately
protected by an award of compensatory damages. For example,
the non-breaching party of a contract for the sale of goods may
recover replacement cost to procure the same goods from another
vendor. In that case, the replacement cost is an
adequate
measure of compensatory damages to protect the non-breaching
party’s right under the contract, which is to obtain the goods or
the reasonable value of what it would cost to obtain the goods from
another seller.
Cases lacking an adequate compensatory damage remedy to
protect a party’s contractual entitlement are often those where an
injunction or specific performance would have been appropriate
had the plaintiff brought an action prior to the breach.70
Comment c of Restatement (Third) Section 39 suggests that one
possible test to determine if the contractual entitlement cannot be
adequately protected by a compensatory damage award is to
conduct a hypothetical test for the availability of either an
injunction or specific performance.71 For example, in Snepp, if the
Government was aware that Snepp intended to release his book
65.
Id. § 39 cmt. f.
66.
Id. § 39(1).
67.
See id.
68.
See Laurin v. DeCarolis Const. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675, 678 (Mass.
1977).
69.
See id.
70.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
71.
Id.
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without obtaining pre-publication review, a court likely would
have issued an injunction preventing Snepp from releasing the
book until he submitted the information for pre-publication
review.72 Instead, the non-breaching party sued after the
performance or non-performance had stopped, thus requiring a
backward-looking remedy instead of the forward-looking remedies
of specific performance or injunction. Specific performance or
injunctive relief would have protected the Government’s
contractual entitlement to pre-publication review when it could
not adequately be compensated by a compensatory damage award.
In the same light, a disgorgement remedy addresses situations
where the plaintiff’s contractual entitlement cannot be protected
through a compensatory damage award, but after specific
performance and injunctive relief are no longer an option.73
2.

Illustrations

Because the requirements for this remedy under Restatement
(Third) Section 39 make an “opportunistic” breach of contract
unique, the drafters included several illustrations of applicable
situations in the law. Many of the illustrations are based on the
cases referenced in other sections of this Comment. This section
outlines some of the other applicable cases for disgorgement of
defendant’s gain that are included in illustrations within
Restatement (Third) Section 39.
In certain circumstances, damages may be compensable, but
still inadequate to protect the plaintiff’s entitlement under the
contract. Illustration 10 demonstrates an example of when the
plaintiff is able to demonstrate compensable loss, but his
compensatory damage award would not protect the rights for
which he bargained in the contract.74 In this illustration, a car
dealer and buyer execute a contract for the sale of a used car for
$5,000, with the stipulation that if the buyer wishes to sell the car
within two years of the purchase, he would sell the car back to the
dealer for $4,000, who could then sell it for that price, plus ten

72.
See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 (1980).
73.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
74. Id. § 39 cmt. d., illus. 10.
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percent commission.75 The buyer deliberately breaches
the
contract, and sells the car one month later to a third party for
$10,000.76 The dealer’s losses equal $400, the ten percent
commission he would have earned from selling the car after
purchasing it back from the buyer.77 Instead of recovering
compensatory damages based on his losses, the dealer could bring
an action seeking restitution for breach of contract, and, under
Section 39, the dealer would be entitled to recover $6,000, the
profits wrongfully gained by the buyer through breaching the
contract by selling the car to a party other than the dealer.78 The
dealer bargained for the right to buy and resell the car if the buyer
decided to get rid of it within the first two years of purchase.79
This right cannot be adequately compensated by the measure of
the plaintiff’s losses, a $400 commission.
Other illustrations in the Restatement (Third) address
situations in which the plaintiff elected to pay in advance for a
certain performance, and defendant breached by failing to
perform.80 For example, Illustration 7 outlines a contract that the
plaintiff City executed with the defendant Fire Department for
fire protection, specifying that a certain number of firefighters,
horses, and wagons were to be available for fire protection at all
times, if needed.81 After the contract expired, the City learned
that the Fire Department deliberately breached the contract by
devoting fewer firefighters, wagons, and horses to this
protection.82 Though the City did not sustain any actual losses
from the breach, it is entitled to the $100,000 saved by the Fire
Department as a result of the breach because the City bargained
for a specific number of resources under the contract, and the Fire
Department profited by limiting those resources.83
Finally, another set of illustrations in Restatement (Third)
Section 39 highlight situations where disgorgement of profit is
needed to adequately protect a plaintiff’s ability to enforce
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 39 cmt. d.
Id.§ 39 cmt. d., illus. 7.
Id.
Id.
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negative covenants.84 For example, in Illustration 8, a plaintiff
landlord contracted to lease property to defendant lessee for one
year at a cost of $100,000, specifying in the contract that the
lessee is not allowed to sublet the property.85 Defendant
deliberately breached the contract, subletting the property to a
third party for $110,000.86 The landlord is likely not able to prove
any actual loss as a result of this breach, and his ability to enforce
a negative covenant in the contract is not protected by
compensatory damages.87 Therefore, in this situation, the
landlord is entitled to the defendant’s $10,000 profit under
Restatement (Third) Section 39.88
C.

Courts Embracing Restatement (Third) Section 39 or
Expanding Disgorgement Theory

In the few years after adopting Restatement (Third) Section
39, a few courts have spoken about it directly and its applicability
in various jurisdictions. Specifically, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the disgorgement remedy and Restatement
(Third) Section 39 with regard to water rights among states.89
Several other courts have embraced Restatement (Third) Section
39 and its requirements for the disgorgement of defendant’s gains
for “opportunistic” breach of contract.90 However, a few
jurisdictions reject Restatement (Third) Section 39 and the
availability of disgorgement of defendant gains for certain types of
breach of contract actions.91
84. Id. § 39 cmt. d., illus. 8.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1056 (2015).
90. See Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 676 (E.D. Pa. 2015)
(recognizing that while opportunities for a remedy for disgorgement of profits
in “opportunistic” breaches of contract are narrow, there are certain
circumstances where a plaintiff may qualify for this relief); Watson v. CalThree, LLC, 254 P.3d 1189, 1194–95 (Colo. App. 2011).
91. See SAS Institute, Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., No. 5:10–CV–
25–FL, 2015 WL 5227801 at *2 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 18, 2015) (rejecting a request
for disgorgement of profits for a breach of licensing contract because the
plaintiff could not produce North Carolina case law that supported this
remedy); Henry v. Masson, 333 S.W.3d 825, 849 (Tex. App. 2010)
(“Disgorgement of profits is not a measure of damages available in breach of
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In Kansas v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court, by a six to three
decision, allowed Kansas to recover $1.8 million of Nebraska’s
profit from breach of the Republican River Compact of 1943 and a
2002 settlement agreement set up to effectuate the Compact.92 A
Special Master found that Nebraska “knowingly failed to comply”
with the Republican River Compact by consuming more water
than the state was allotted, and because the value of water in
Nebraska exceeded that in Kansas, Nebraska’s gain from the
breach exceeded Kansas’ loss.93 The Court supported the Special
Master’s findings and adopted his recommendation of a
disgorgement remedy because Nebraska profited directly from its
deliberate breach by consuming 70,869 extra acre-feet of water.94
Additionally, the Court concluded that awarding compensatory
damages would be inadequate because, “that remedy alone ‘would
permit [an upstream State] to ignore its obligation to deliver
water so long as it is willing’ to pay that amount.”95 Ultimately,
the United States Supreme Court cited Restatement (Third)
Section 39 as a basis for Kansas’s entitlement to a disgorgement
remedy, embracing the availability of this remedy in certain types
of breach of contract claims.96
Justice Thomas’s dissent, however, was more skeptical of the
disgorgement remedy and the influence of Restatement (Third)
Section 39.97 First, he disagreed with the use of disgorgement in
this particular case because the disgorgement remedy was meant
for deliberate and intentional breaches, and disagreed with the
majority’s position that Nebraska “knowingly” breaching the
contract equated to intentionally breaching the contract.98 He
also observed that the Supreme Court had never used the
disgorgement remedy before, and that, “[t]he sheer novelty of this
proposed remedy counsels against applying it [in the case].”99
Since 2011, a few other courts have expressly adopted Section
39 as a basis for a disgorgement remedy in breach of contract
contract action.”).
92. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1049, 1050, 1051.
93. Id. at 1051, 1053–54.
94. Id. at 1057.
95. Id. (quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 132 (1987)).
96. See id. at 1057.
97. Id. at 1068 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1069.
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actions. Specifically, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania and the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania have concluded that Pennsylvania state law
supported disgorgement of defendant’s gain as an appropriate
remedy for “opportunistic” breaches of contract.100
Furthermore, one jurisdiction even expanded the scope of
Restatement (Third) Section 39 requirements.101 In Watson v. CalThree, L.L.C., the Colorado Appellate Court concluded that a
defendant was allowed to recover plaintiff’s profits on a
counterclaim for breach of contract in a loan transaction for real
estate.102 The court stated that, “[i]f the breaching party’s
wrongdoing is intentional or substantial, or there are no other
means of measuring the wrongdoer’s enrichment, recovery of the
breaching party’s profits may be granted.”103 This court’s
standard for awarding disgorgement of profits for “opportunistic”
breach of contract is even lower than the Restatement (Third)
provision because it allows for recovery of this remedy when the
breach is substantial but unintentional.104
Both prior and subsequent to the Restatement (Third) Section
39, several states and the United States Supreme Court have
recognized a plaintiff’s entitlement to a disgorgement remedy for a
deliberate breach of contracts such as those for the sale of land,
contractual protection of confidential information, non-compete
agreements, and breach of water compacts.105 These courts have
recognized that in certain contractual relationships, a non100. See Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 678 (E.D. Pa.
2015); In re 400 Walnut Associates, L.P., 506 B.R. 645, 668 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2014) (“Pennsylvania law supports an award for restitution as to contract as
well as tort.”).
101. See Watson v. Cal-Three, LLC, 254 P.3d 1189, 1190 (Colo. App.
2011).
102. 254 P.3d at 1194–95.
103. Id. at 1195 (citing EarthInfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants,
Inc., 900 P.2d 113, 119 (Colo. 1995)) (emphasis added).
104. See id. An example of a substantial breach can be found in
EarthInfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., where the Colorado
Supreme Court determined that the defendant “substantially” breached the
contract when it unilaterally decided to stop royalty payments to the plaintiff
pending clarification of obligations under the contract. 900 P.2d at 116, 119.
105. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1056 (2015); Snepp v. U.S.,
444 U.S. 507, 515 (1980); Y.J.D. Restaurant Supply Co. v. Dib, 413 N.Y.S.2d
835, 835–36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979); Laurin v. DeCarolis Const. Co., 363 N.E. 2d
675, 679 (Mass. 2015).
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breaching party is vulnerable and is not able to protect its
bargained for entitlement under the contract because damages
from a breach would likely result in little or no provable
compensatory damages. Therefore, the disgorgement remedy
serves as an effective alternative for a plaintiff, because, as the
United States Supreme Court noted in Snepp, without the
disgorgement remedy, the non-breaching party is deprived of
means to protect the very thing it sought to protect under the
contract.106
II. DISGORGEMENT OF DEFENDANT’S GAIN IN RHODE ISLAND LAW

Rhode Island has little case law discussing disgorgement of
defendant’s gains as a potential remedy both in contract and other
contexts. When Rhode Island has allowed a plaintiff to recover a
defendant’s gains, courts have structured it as the remedy of an
“accounting for profits,” rather than “disgorgement of profit or
gain.”107 An accounting for profits is a remedy that “compel[s] a
defendant to account for and pay over money owed to the plaintiff
but held by the defendant.”108 Therefore, though the method
includes one extra step, taking an account of the profits, the end
result is essentially the same, because the defendant must turn its
profits over to the plaintiff.
A.

Contract Context

Rhode Island case law varies in its recognition of a
disgorgement remedy for certain types of breach of contract
claims.109 In cases where the contract at issue is a contract for
the sale of land, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized
the possibility of disgorgement of defendant’s gains from a
deliberate breach of contract.110 Additionally, Rhode Island has
allowed a plaintiff to recover disgorgement of profits earned
during delay in actions for specific performance of a contract for
the sale of land where the defendant has breached the contract by
106. See 444 U.S. at 514–16.
107. See, e.g., George v. George F. Berkander, Inc., 169 A.2d 370, 371 (R.I.
1961).
108. 1A C.J.S. Accounting § 6 (2016).
109. See George, 169 A.2d at 371; Sweeney v. Brow, 86 A. 115, 118–19
(R.I. 1913); Bright v. James, 87 A. 316, 317 (R.I. 1913).
110. See Bright, 87 A. at 317.

2017]

DISGORGEMENT REMEDY

631

delaying conveyance.111 In another case dealing with a noncompete contract, the Rhode Island Supreme Court denied the
plaintiff’s request for disgorgement of gains for breach of the
contract.112 However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has
recognized that there are situations where compensatory damages
are inadequate to remedy the plaintiff, and instead issued
injunctive relief or specific performance of the contract.113
Although there is little Rhode Island case law regarding
disgorgement of defendant’s gains in a breach of contract action,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has at least discussed the
possibility of the disgorgement remedy in the context of contracts
for the sale of land.114 In Bright v. James, Bright brought an
action for specific performance of the contract for the sale of land,
and additionally, an accounting of the defendant’s profits from
selling timber that had been cut from the land after the execution
of the contract.115 The trial court awarded Bright an accounting
for those profits.116 On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
reversed the award; instead, awarding the fair market value of the
timber, rather than the specific profits of the defendant. Because
it concluded that the defendant believed the contract was
abandoned, the fair market value for the sale of the timber would
be a fair measure of damages, similar to a situation where the
plaintiff had brought an action in conversion.117 By requiring the
defendant to pay the value of the timber for sale, the court still
required the defendant to give up his gains from the breach of
111. Sweeny, 86 A. at 119 (awarding a non-breaching party an accounting
for profit of the rents collected between execution of the contract and
resolution of the case as a result of the deliberate breach of the defendant
seller).
112. George, 169 A.2d at 373.
113. Griffin v. Zapata, 570 A.2d 659, 661–62 (R.I. 1990) (granting specific
performance in an action for breach of contract for the sale of property
because, “[t]he granting of specific performance is appropriate when adequate
compensation cannot be achieved through money damages as where the item
is unique and distinctive, such as land”).
114. Bright, 87 A. at 316–17.
115. Bright v. James, 85 A. 545, 545, 546 (R.I. 1913).
116. Bright, 87 A. at 317.
117. Id. This case is analogous to Laurin v. DeCarolis Const. Co., infra
Part I.A.1, in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court awarded the
plaintiff the value of timber defendant sold in breach of a contract for the sale
of land. 363 N.E.2d 675, 678 (Mass. 1977). The drafters of Restatement
(Third) § 39 cite to Laurin as authority for the Restatement (Third) provision.
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contract, though it may not have been the exact dollar amount of
his profit, and did not require any proof of losses from the
plaintiff.118 Additionally, it seems that the court would have
allowed the plaintiff to recover the full value of the defendant’s
profit had it not found that the defendant thought the contract
had lapsed.119
Similarly, in Sweeny v. Brow, the plaintiffs sued the
defendant seller for breach of a contract for the sale of land, and
asked for the remedy of an accounting of the defendant’s profits
from cutting growing crops on the land after the execution of the
contract.120 The court found that the contract for the sale of land
was valid, and, therefore, that the plaintiff was entitled to an
accounting of the crops cut and removed from the land from the
date of execution of the contract.121
The only other Rhode Island case law that discusses a
disgorgement remedy is George v. George F. Berkander, Inc., a
1961 Rhode Island Supreme Court case.122 In George, the plaintiff
and defendant entered into a contract in which the plaintiff
authorized the defendant to use its process for encasing small
objects in plastic-like material, called Lucite, and to sell those
objects in states other than Rhode Island.123 The defendant
deliberately breached the contract by selling the items in Rhode
Island, and the plaintiff brought an action for breach of
contract,124 seeking an injunction barring the defendant from
selling in Rhode Island, and further, an accounting of the
defendant’s gains as a result of selling the items in the state.125
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the plaintiff would be
entitled to a remedy for breach of contract to the extent that it
118. See generally Bright, 87 A. at 317.
119. See id.
120. 86 A. 115, 115–16 (R.I. 1913).
121. Id. at 118–19.
122. 169 A.2d 370, 370 (R.I. 1961).
123. Id. at 370–71.
124. The plaintiffs brought an action for breach of contract, seeking a
restitutionary remedy for disgorgement of defendant’s profits, but, based on
the argument for disgorgement, the court assumed that the plaintiff wanted
the court to analyze the case as both a breach of contract action and a claim
for unfair competition. George, 169 A.2d at 370–71. The court found that the
plaintiff did not meet the elements of a claim for unfair competition. Id. at
371.
125. Id.
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could prove its losses, but that it was not entitled to disgorgement
of the defendant’s profits from the breach.126 The court reasoned
that, “[t]here was nothing in the record here that would warrant
the establishment of a more extensive measure of damages.”127
Ultimately, the court concluded that the plaintiff could not prove
loss of profits and thus was not entitled to a monetary remedy for
the defendant’s sale of goods in Rhode Island in breach of the
contract.128
On its face, the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s ruling in
George may appear to pose a problem to plaintiffs seeking
disgorgement of defendant’s gains in a breach of a non-compete
contract in particular.129 However, the court’s reasoning can be
distinguished from the principles espoused in Restatement (Third)
Section 39. Implicit in the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s opinion
in George is its conclusion that a remedy based on defendant’s
profits would be punitive.130 Because the court characterized the
disgorgement award as a punitive damage award, it is
understandable why the court dismissed the award’s applicability
to a breach of contract case because normally, punitive damages
are not permitted in breach of contract actions.131 However,
Restatement (Third) Section 39 does not propose a punitive
remedy for breach of contract. Rather, it proposes restitution as
an alternative to a compensatory damage remedy in
“opportunistic” breach of contract actions.132 In fact, the theory
behind the disgorgement award is to provide the plaintiff with
126. Id. at 373.
127. Id.
128. Id. The superior court separately found that the defendants failed to
pay royalty payments for one item under the contract, and held that the
plaintiffs were entitled to a monetary award for the total of the royalty
payments, $158.91. Id. at 371.
129. See id. at 371–72.
130. Id. at 371 (emphasis added). The Rhode Island Supreme Court
suggested that a remedy based upon defendant’s profits rather
than
plaintiff’s losses in an unfair competition claim may be awarded, but refers to
this remedy as “punitive.” Specifically, the court stated, “[a plaintiff may] in
appropriate circumstances, be awarded punitive damages by requiring
respondent to account . . . for such profits as arose out of the deception.” Id.
131. O’Coin v. Woonsocket Inst. Trust Co., 535 A.2d 1263, 1266 (R.I.
1988).
132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
(AM. LAW INST. 2011).
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value to which it was entitled under the contract by denying the
defendant the ability to keep its wrongful gains.133
Also, George did not entirely close the door on the possibility
of a remedy outside of that which is typical for contract actions.
The court contended that there may be “special circumstance[s]”
that “warrant the establishment of a more extensive measure of
damages.”134 By saying this, the court implicitly suggested that
the normal compensatory damage remedy may not be adequate in
all breach of contract actions. Through this suggestion, the court
is preparing to recognize a remedy in the future such as is
described here.
In sum, Rhode Island case law does not have a clear direction
for recognition of a plaintiff’s right to recover defendant’s gains for
breach of contract claims. The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s
ruling on the disgorgement remedy in George does not represent
the consensus for Rhode Island law on the disgorgement of
defendant’s gains in all breach of contract actions. In Bright v.
James and Sweeny v. Brow, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
explicitly allowed for the possibility of disgorgement of defendant’s
gains from cutting timber or crops in breach of contracts for the
sale of land.135 Rhode Island’s recognition of a disgorgement
remedy in contracts for the sale of land and contexts outside of
breach of contract lend the conclusion that it would not be far
reaching for courts to allow a disgorgement remedy in
“opportunistic” breaches of contract. Rhode Island has already
acknowledged the availability of disgorgement in several contexts,
and therefore, should extend this allowance to include all
“opportunistic” breaches of contract.
B. Other Contexts
Rhode Island case law recognizes a disgorgement remedy for
plaintiffs in actions other than those involving contracts. In
addition, Rhode Island specifically allows the plaintiff to recover
defendant’s gains in claims for unfair competition and breach of
fiduciary duty.136
133. Laurin v. DeCarolis Const. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675, 679 (Mass. 2015).
134. George, 169 A.2d at 372–73.
135. Bright v. James, 85 A. 545, 546 (R.I. 1913); Sweeny v. Brow, 86 A.
115, 119 (R.I. 1913).
136. See Bostitch v. King Fastener Co., 140 A.2d 274, 283 (R.I. 1958).
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Unfair Competition

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has expressly allowed a
plaintiff to recover defendant’s gains in cases of unfair competition
where the plaintiff can prove fraud.137 The leading case is
Bostitch, Inc. v. King Fastener Co., where the court found the
defendant was liable in a claim for unfair competition when it
purposely copied the plaintiff’s packaging for staples.138 The
plaintiff, a leading manufacturer of staplers and other associated
products, used a well-known green and yellow packaging design
for its boxes of staples.139 The defendant sold its staples in a box
almost identical to the plaintiff’s, particularly with the green and
yellow color scheme.140 Approximately twenty percent of the
defendant’s profits were earned through selling staples to fit
plaintiff’s staplers in those yellow and green boxes.141 The
superior court required the defendant to disgorge its profits from
staple sales to the plaintiffs.142 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
ultimately reversed the superior court because in this case, the
plaintiff could not prove fraud, but the court expressly stated that
a plaintiff could recover defendant’s ill-gotten gains from unfair
competition.143 In this case, it would have been difficult for the
plaintiff to prove its losses as a result of the defendant’s
wrongdoing.144 Had the court found fraud and allowed the
disgorgement remedy, it would have been the only method to
deprive the defendant of its wrongfully acquired gains.145
2.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Rhode Island has also recognized a disgorgement remedy for
claims of breach of fiduciary duty.146 In fact, in Grant v. Nyman,
137. Id. at 284.
138. 140 A.2d 274, 278 (R.I. 1958).
139. Id. at 277.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 279.
143. Id. at 283–84 (“It is well established in cases involving unfair
competition that remedies available to an injured party include . . . the
ordering of an accounting to the injured party by the offending party for all
profits arising out of the imitation . . . .”).
144. See id. at 278.
145. Id. at 284.
146. See Lawton v. Nyman, 357 F. Supp. 2d 428 (D.R.I. 2005).
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the plaintiff requested disgorgement of the defendant’s gains from
a breach of fiduciary duty.147 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
stated in response that the “traditional equity remedy for breach
of fiduciary duty is the monetary remedy of an ‘accounting.’”148
A specific example of this is found in Lawton v. Nyman.149 In
that case, the United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island, interpreting a state law claim, discussed the
availability of the disgorgement remedy under Rhode Island law
for breach of fiduciary duty.150 The court ultimately awarded
compensatory damages because the damage award equaled the
amount of the defendant’s profit as a result of the breach of
fiduciary duty.151 However, the court expressly stated that a
remedy requiring the defendant to disgorge his gains for breach of
fiduciary duty would also be appropriate in this case.152 In
response to the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff did not
produce evidence to establish a constructive trust—a different
equitable remedy—the court held that as an alternative to a
constructive trust, “disgorgement or a money judgment may be
appropriate remedies for unjust enrichment, especially when the
plaintiff is not seeking to recover particular property or a specific
fund of money.”153
III. RHODE ISLAND SHOULD ALLOW FOR DISGORGEMENT OF DEFENDANT
GAINS IN “OPPORTUNISTIC” BREACH OF CONTRACT CASES

Case law demonstrates that many courts allow for plaintiffs
to recover the defendant’s gains from breach of “opportunistic”
contract in several situations, including: contracts for the sale of
land; contractual entitlements to protection of confidential
information; and breach of non-compete contracts.154 In Rhode
Island, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized the
147. No. PC03-2893, 2004 WL 1769150, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 9,
2004).
148. Id. at *2 (quoting In re Evangelista, 760 F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1985)).
149. 357 F.Supp.2d 428, 430–31 (D.R.I. 2005).
150. Id. at 434.
151. Id. at 440.
152. Id. at 434.
153. Id.
154. Snepp v. U.S., 444 U.S. 507, 516 (1980); Y.J.D. Restaurant Supply
Co. v. Dib, 413 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (N.Y. 1979); Laurin v. DeCarolis Const. Co.,
363 N.E.2d 675, 679 (Mass. 2015).
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possibility of a remedy based on defendant’s gains in contracts for
the sale of land, along with contexts outside of contract claims,
including unfair competition and breach of fiduciary duty.155
Based on the logic of these cases, Rhode Island should extend
recognition of a disgorgement remedy for all “opportunistic”
contract claims.
Ultimately, a remedy in restitution for disgorgement of
defendant’s gains makes sense when the defendant commits an
“opportunistic” breach of contract. When entering into a contract,
parties bargain for certain rights that they expect will be fulfilled
by performance of the contract. Typically, a party then has the
choice to perform the contract or to breach and then pay
compensation for plaintiff’s losses resulting from the breach.156
However, in cases where there has been an “opportunistic” breach,
payment of compensatory damages is insufficient to protect the
rights that the non-breaching party bargained for under the
contract, and the disgorgement remedy is needed.157
A disgorgement remedy for an “opportunistic” breach of
contract encourages voluntary transactions and reinforces the
stability of contracts because it protects the parties’ contractual
positions.158 The disgorgement remedy also reinforces a recurring
theme in the law of unjust enrichment that a conscious wrongdoer
should not be able to keep its gains.159 If the defendant’s “liability
is limited to provable damages[,]” then the “defendant’s election to
disregard the plaintiff’s entitlement is inadequately deterred.”160
Further, the disgorgement remedy in the Restatement (Third)
Section 39 protects the “integrity of the parties’ bargain and of the
bargaining process by which contracts are made,” because it
encourages both parties to respect the entitlements under the
contract.161 Those situations that meet the requirements under
155. George v. George F. Berkander, Inc., 169 A.2d 370, 371 (R.I. 1961);
Sweeney v. Brow, 86 A. 115, 118–19 (R.I. 1913); Bright v. James, 87 A. 316,
317 (R.I. 1913).
156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
157. Id.
158. Id. § 39 cmt. b.
159. Id. § 39 cmt. a.
160. Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the “Restitution Interest,”
and the Restatement of Contracts, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2021, 2045 (2001).
161. Id.
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the Restatement (Third) Section 39 include contractual
entitlements that cannot be easily valued monetarily.162 Instead
of allowing the defendant to take advantage of a vulnerable party
by deliberately breaching a contract and profiting from that
breach, a disgorgement remedy encourages adherence to the
contract.163 For example, an employee that has signed a noncompete agreement will be deterred from breaching that
agreement if the employee knows that the employee will have to
disgorge all of his or her gains from the breach. The availability of
the disgorgement remedy encourages both parties to perform
under the contract, particularly where one party’s entitlements
under the contract are vulnerable.
Also, a disgorgement remedy for “opportunistic” breach of
contract does not undermine the norm of compensatory damages
in breach of contract claims because the disgorgement remedy is
narrowly tailored to specific circumstances that likely will be
infrequent.164 More often than not, a non-breaching party will be
adequately protected by a compensatory damage remedy from
provable damages.165
The disgorgement remedy for “opportunistic” breach of
contract is rooted in two major policy considerations. First, a
disgorgement remedy for breach of contract protects those rights
bargained for under a contract that cannot be
adequately
protected by an award of compensatory damages.166 Second,
disgorgement reiterates the theory in restitution that a conscious
wrongdoer should not be allowed to keep its ill-gotten gains.167
Because Rhode Island courts have granted specific performance or
injunctive relief in breach of contract actions,168 thereby
recognizing that some contractual rights cannot be adequately
protected through compensatory damages, and because Rhode
Island courts have already granted the disgorgement remedy in
some cases, courts in Rhode Island should follow other jurisdiction
in allowing the disgorgement remedy for “opportunistic” breaches
162. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
163. Id. § 39 cmt. a.
164. Id. § 39 cmt. c.
165. See id. § 39 cmt. a.
166. See id. § 39 cmt. a.
167. See id. § 39 cmt. b.
168. Griffin v. Zapata, 570 A.2d 659, 661–62 (R.I. 1990).
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of contract.
IV. CONCLUSION

The law encourages and supports voluntary transactions
through the formation of contracts. Sometimes, parties bargain
for rights under a contract that cannot be adequately protected
with an award of compensatory damages. In the rare situation
where the defendant has deliberately breached the contract,
profited from the breach, and a compensatory damage remedy
would be inadequate to protect the right that was bargained for
under the contract, the Restatement (Third) Section 39 provides
an alternative remedy in a claim for restitution of disgorgement of
defendant’s gains for the non-breaching party.169
The trend of case law has demonstrated a tendency to
recognize the availability of disgorgement of a defendant’s profits
that have exceeded the plaintiff’s provable losses or where the
plaintiff cannot prove losses at all. Several jurisdictions have
either expressly allowed for this type of remedy in breach of
contract actions, like Massachusetts in Laurin, or have adopted
Restatement (Third) Section 39 word for word, like the United
States Supreme Court in Kansas. While Rhode Island law varies
with respect to its stance on a disgorgement remedy in breach of
contract actions, in the past, it has awarded plaintiffs
disgorgement of defendant’s gains based on contracts for the sale
of land as well as other contexts.170 Therefore, Rhode Island
should recognize a plaintiff’s right to a remedy of disgorgement of
defendant’s gains in “opportunistic” breach of contract actions.

169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39
(AM. LAW INST. 2011).
170. See George v. George F. Berkender, 169 A.2d 370, 371 (R.I. 1961);
Bright v. James, 87 A. 316, 317 (R.I. 1913).

